One potential reason for bubbles evolving prior to the financial crisis was excessive risk taking stemming from option-like incentive schemes in financial institutions. By running laboratory asset markets, we investigate the impact of option-like incentives on price formation and trading behavior. We observe (i) that option-like incentives induce significantly higher market prices than linear incentives. We further find that (ii) option-like incentives provoke subjects to behave differently and to take more risk than subjects with linear incentives. We finally show that (iii) trading at inflated prices is rational for subjects with option-like incentives since it increases their expected payout.
Introduction
The role of specific compensation structures of financial market participants has become a highly discussed issue since the unfolding of the financial crisis in [2007] [2008] . It has been argued that bubbles in several markets were caused by excessive risk taking which stemmed from bonus payment systems and option-like compensation structures in financial institutions (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010; Dewatripont et al., 2010; French et al., 2010; Gennaioli et al., 2012) . According to Rajan (2006) , one of the main origins of instability in highly developed financial markets are widely used convex incentives structures. 1 He argues that, compared to the 1970s, the reduced downside and the strongly increased upside potentials of investment managers' compensation create stronger incentives to take risks.
From the 1970s onwards, many investors started to delegate their portfolio to financial professionals. In general, this delegation of individuals' investment portfolios to financial professionals results in asymmetric information and creates a moral hazard problem (Allen, 2001) . To solve the problems of moral hazard, various mechanisms are used to align the interests of the investment manager (agent) and the investor (principal) . The most common mechanisms in the financial industry are bonus payments and option-like incentive contracts (Allen and Gorton, 1993; Kritzman, 1987) . However, Rajan (2006) argues that managerial incentives are not always aligned with the investors' interests and these misalignments may result in distortions on financial markets.
Allen and Gorton (1993) model this agency problem theoretically. In their model the investment manager does not share the losses but receives a proportion of the profits. 2 They report "rational bubbles", as the convex incentive structure induces the investment manager to trade at prices far above funda-mentals. This problem is similar to the risk-shifting problem in Jensen and Meckling (1976) where corporations' shareholders obtain any upside potential but do not bear the full downside risk because of limited liability. Consequently, even risky negative net present value projects may be attractive for the shareholders. Likewise, Allen and Gale (2000) examine how intermediation by the banking sector leads to a similar agency problem which also results in asset bubbles.
Although these financial incentives are nowadays one of the major trading motives of financial professionals, little is known about the consequences of convex incentives on price formation in asset markets. 3 Only James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James (2003) investigate price formation in experimental markets under tournament incentive structures. They show that moderate overvaluation emerges under tournament incentives for all traders.
We run laboratory experiments to examine price formation and trading behavior under two different compensation structures. Inspired by Allen and Gorton (1993) and Rajan (2006) , we address the following questions:
Research Question 1: Do option-like incentives trigger different price dynamics than linear incentives?
Research question 2: To what extent do option-like incentives change traders'
behavior?
To answer the research questions, we implement two different incentive structures. In the first two treatments (Treatment LINEAR and Treatment CONVEX) we either apply a linear or a convex incentive structure for all subjects. In a third treatment (Treatment HYBRID) we endow half of the subjects with linear incentives and half of the subjects with convex incentives. The goal of this treatment is to analyze whether already a lower fraction of subjects with convex incentives induces different price dynamics and whether subjects with different incentives behave differently when competing in the same market. 3 The impact of many different factors on price formation has been investigated especially in laboratory asset markets. The most prominent drivers of mispricing are lottery assets (Ackert et al., 2006) , speculation (Lei et al., 2001) , confusion (Kirchler et al., 2012) , and positive liquidity shocks (Caginalp et al., 1998 (Caginalp et al., , 2001 Haruvy and Noussair, 2006) .
We observe (i) significantly higher market prices when subjects are incentivized with option-like incentives than with linear incentives. We further show that (ii) option-like incentives induce subjects to behave differently and to take more risk than subjects with linear incentives. Finally, we report that (iii) trading at inflated prices is rational from an individual perspective since it increases the expected payout of option-like incentivized subjects. However, overvalued prices are harmful for the real economy as prices no longer reflect the assets' future cash flows and therefore prevent the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
The Experiment
In each market ten subjects trade assets of a fictive company for experimental currency (Taler) in a sequence of twelve periods of 120 seconds each. 4 At the beginning of each market subjects are endowed with 40 assets and 2000 Taler.
Valued at the expected cash-flow, i.e., expected terminal dividend (ED), of 25 each subject's initial wealth is 3000 Taler in each treatment. Taler and asset holdings are carried over from one period to the next. No interest is paid on Taler holdings and there are no transaction costs.
Experimental Treatments
To achieve comparability it is necessary to set up the treatments in a way that expected earnings are identical across treatments. In particular, the incentive structures in all treatments are modelled such that the expected earnings of a risk-neutral hold strategy are EUR 15. Table 1 presents an overview of the treatment abbreviations and parameters.
Treatment LINEAR endows all subjects with a linear incentive structure. 5 Treatment CONVEX endows all subjects with a convex incentive structure.
In particular, the option-like payment kicks in at a wealth level of 3000 Taler (similar to an "at-the-money" Call option). 6 The fixed payment is EUR 8 and the bonus payment (slope of the payoff function in Figure 1 ) is set to EUR 2.1875 for every 100 Taler in wealth exceeding 3000 Taler. If a subject holds the 6 Typically, the compensation structures in the investment industry include two main components (Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011) . One component is linearly or non-linearly related to the performance of the portfolio. The other component is linearly related to the absolute value of the managed portfolio. However, net investment flows are less sensitive to past returns when these are bad and much more sensitive when performance is good (see e.g. Brown et al. (1996) , Chevalier and Ellsion (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ). Thus, the second compensation component is implicitly convex in performance as well. Therefore, our simple convex incentive structure mimics the compensation structure of investment managers on real markets. Of course, traders on real markets face other social, legal and moral consequences that we cannot model in our experiment. However, the isolation from a specific real-world context is typical for all kinds of laboratory work. It might even be less relevant in market experiments as social preferences are less important and therefore do not influence results (see the discussions in Levitt and List (2007) and Al-Ubaydli and List (2012)). Treatment HYBRID endows five subjects with the linear incentives of Treatment LINEAR and five subjects with the convex incentives of Treatment CONVEX in each market. Subjects knew that other subjects in the market were incentivized differently, but they were not aware of the precise incentive structure of the others and the number of subjects being incentivized differently. Figure 1 displays the two incentive structures used in the various treatments. 
Market Architecture
Subjects trade in a continuous double auction with open order books (see the Appendix for a screenshot and a detailed explanation of the trading screen).
Firstly, all orders are executed according to price and secondly, time priority. Market orders have priority over limit orders and are always executed instantaneously. Any order size, the partial execution of limit orders, and deleting of already posted limit orders are possible. Shorting assets and borrowing money is not allowed.
Experimental Implementation
Six markets were run for each treatment. All 18 markets were conducted at the Universities of Gothenburg and Innsbruck with a total of 180 students (bachelor and master students in business administration and economics). Three markets of each treatment were run at each University. 7 Each subject participated in only one market and we made sure that subjects did not participate in earlier asset market experiments of comparable design. The markets were programmed and conducted with z-Tree 3.2.8. by Fischbacher (2007) . Subjects were recruited using ORSEE by Greiner (2004) . In total, each experimental session lasted approximately 75 minutes, including 20 minutes to study the written instructions, three trial periods and the main experiment. Average earnings of the experimental subjects were EUR 15.6. 
Results

Descriptives
Research Question 1
To answer the first research question whether option-like incentives lead to different price levels than linear incentives, we run pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests. 
Research Question 2
To answer the second research question whether subjects' behavior changes when incentivized differently, Treatment HYBRID is most suitable since subjects with both incentive structures trade in the same market environment.
We find that subjects who are incentivized with convex incentives show a markedly different trading behavior and take on more risk compared to subjects with linear incentives. 10 We derive our results from a LS-regression with clustered standard errors on a market level:
The binary dummy CON V EX j is 1 if subject j is endowed with a convex incentive structure, zero otherwise. y j is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables STOCK, MONEY, PFRISK, and ACCRATIO. For the variables STOCK and MONEY we take the median in asset and cash holdings from period 8 to 12 of subject j, respectively. This serves as reliable proxy for subjects'
final endowments, as the experiment can be terminated beginning in period 8.
We apply the same approach for variable PFRISK which measures the absolute difference in portfolio wealth between the high state and the low state of the 9 The Appendix provides details on other descriptive market variables. Share turnover (ST ) is applied as a measure of trading volume, the average bid-ask-spread as a percentage of the ED in the market (SPREAD), and the standard deviation of log-returns (SD RET ) as a proxy volatility in the various markets. However, we detect no significant differences in any of the investigated variables. 10 We ran a risk aversion test before the experiment and we found no significant difference between the two subgroups. Therefore, all observe differences are due to the incentive structure.
buyback price. With this variable we measure the riskiness of each subject's portfolio. In particular, a low number hints at a low-risk portfolio while a high number points at a risky portfolio with major investments in the risky asset.
Finally, ACCRATIO serves as a proxy for the cautiousness of subjects and is defined as the number of all posted market orders of subject j divided by the total number of her posted limit orders (Kirchler et al., 2011) . For instance, a high value of acceptance ratio indicates a more immediate and risky trading behavior. Table 4 outlines the results. Dependent variables: STOCK: median stock holdings of subject j from period 8 to 12. MONEY: absolute median money holdings of subject j from period 8 to 12. PFRISK: median difference of the portfolio value in case of a high buyback price and in case of a low buyback price of subject j from period 8 to 12. ACCRATIO: acceptance ratio of subject j (market orders divided by limit orders). z-values are given in parentheses. CONVEX: binary dummy showing 1, if subject j is incentivized with a convex incentive structure, zero otherwise. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% significance levels of a double-sided test.
First, one can see from column STOCK that subjects with convex incentives hold significantly more stocks in their portfolio. While subjects with linear incentives only hold 28 stocks, those endowed with convex incentives hold 51 towards the end of the experiment. 11
Second, we find the opposite effect for endowments in cash as outlined in column MONEY. Subjects with linear incentives hold on average 2375 units of cash, while subjects with convex incentives show significantly lower money holdings by 30% towards the end of the experiment.
Third, we report that subjects with convex incentives have a significantly 11 Note that with endowments being calculated as the median of each subject, numbers do not necessarily sum up to on average 40 stocks and 2000 in cash.
riskier portfolio composition than subjects with linear incentives (see column PFRISK). The differences are strong in magnitude as portfolio risk of option-like incentivized subjects is more than 80% higher compared to the one of linearly incentivized subjects.
Fourth, subjects show differences in their cautiousness to trade (see column ACCRATIO). In particular, the acceptance ratio of subjects with a convex incentive structure is more than 2.5 times higher compared to subjects with a linear incentive structure. This indicates that subjects with convex incentives actively seek to maximize their expected payout by a rather impatient and risk seeking trading behavior.
To sum up, subjects directly respond to the applied incentives and show significantly different trading patterns, which answers research question 2 affirmatively.
Discussion
The goal of this section is to analyze whether the observed prices are a rational response to the different incentives. Therefore, we detecte the trading price at which individual subjects are indifferent between buying and selling assets, i.e. the subjects' reservation price (RP), under different incentives. We assume that the representative agent j maximizes his expected profit. We further assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the representative agent does not make net capital gains from trading and therefore the volume-weighted average price of all purchases equals the volume-weighted average price of all sales. So, p j is the average trading price of agent j.
In Treatment LINEAR, the Taler value of the cash position of agent j at the end of the market is equal to 2000 + (40 − n) · p j where n is the number of assets held at the end. The Taler value of her asset position is n j · d i where d i is the terminal dividend in state i (either low or high). The expected Euro payoff E(Payoff) j of agent j can be written as,
where FX is the exchange rate Taler to Euro and π i stands for the probability of the terminal dividend d i in state i. If the average trading price is above (below) 25, the expected payoff to a net seller increases (decreases) and the expected payoff to a net buyer decreases (increases). Thus, the representative agent has no incentives to acquire (sell) assets at prices above (below) 25 since this would reduce his profits. Thus, 25 will be his reservation price with linear incentives.
In contrast, Equation (3) shows the expected Euro payoff E(Payoff) j for the representative agent under a convex incentive structure (Treatment CONVEX):
It is evident from equation (3) 
Conclusion
In this paper we used laboratory asset markets to examine whether option-like incentives lead to different price dynamics and trading behavior. We observed (i) overvalued prices when subjects were endowed with option-like incentives. Furthermore, we found (ii) that subjects, when incentivized option-like, showed subgroups. Therefore, we refrain from providing a clear benchmark for Treatment HYBRID. a different trading behavior and took on significantly more risk than subjects with linear incentives. We concluded that (iii) trading at overvalued prices and taking on excessive risks were rational for traders with convex incentives.
Due to the convexity of option-like incentives trading at these prices increases traders' expected payouts. Although rational from a trader perspective, overvalued assets are harmful for other "market participants": (1) Investors frequently delegate their portfolio to investment managers with convex incentives. These investors, however, face a linear incentive structure and therefore carry the losses of buying overvalued assets. Furthermore, (2) the real economy and society as a whole suffer losses as asset prices do no longer reflect discounted future cash flows and therefore efficient allocation of scarce resources is harmed. For instance, these inflated prices might especially be problematic when a sufficient number of option-like incentivized traders inflate prices of commodities, leading to distortions in several industrial sectors.
We further extend existing literature along three dimensions. First, we contribute to the literature on whether option-like incentives lead to a risk-shifting problem and asset overvaluation as argued by Allen and Gorton (1993) . Our experimental results suggest that when subjects have convex incentives, they quickly recognize the risk-shifting problem and bid up prices close to their individual reservation price. Thus, we arrive experimentally at similar results as Allen and Gorton (1993).
Second, earlier experimental studies on asset overvaluation mainly discuss irrational explanations such as capital-gains trading (Smith et al., 1988) , speculation (Lei et al., 2001) or confusion (Kirchler et al., 2012) . Except the studies of James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James (2003) little is known about the role of incentives on price formation in experimental asset markets. We contribute to this line of literature by documenting rational overvaluation.
Third, our research is in line with the claim of Rajan (2006) that one of the main origins of instability in highly developed financial markets are convex incentives of market participants. Compared to the 1970s the reduced downside and strongly increased upside potentials of investment managers' compensation create stronger incentives to take risks. Consequently, this increases the likelihood that managerial incentives are not always aligned with the investors' interests and these misalignments may result in distortions such as mispricing of assets.
Sirri, E. R., Tufano, P. (1998) . Costly search and mutual fund flows. The Journal of Finance, 53(5) , 1589 -1622 . Smith, V., Suchanek, G. L., Williams, A. W. (1988 . Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica, 56(5), 1119-1151. is applied as a measure of trading volume, the average bid-ask-spread as a percentage of the ED in the market (SPREAD), and the standard deviation of log-returns (SD RET ) as a proxy volatility in the various markets. Table   A2 shows the results. In particular, treatments show moderate differences in these variables. However, we detect no significant differences between any of the investigated variables. Table A1 : Additional market variables: Share turnover (ST), bid-ask-spread (SPREAD), and standard deviation of log-returns (SD RET).
Measure calculation
Share turnover
Notes: ED = expected terminal dividend. V OLp = trading volume in period p; TSO = total shares outstanding; SP READp = (volume-weighted) mean difference between best bid and best ask at every trade t in period p; N = total number of periods; Rt = ln(Pt/(P t−1 )); T = total number of trades; R = average log return. 
Appendix C: Experimental Instructions
Instructions for Treatment LINEAR and Treatment HYBRID 13
General Information
This experiment is concerned with replicating an asset market where traders can trade assets of a fictive company for 8-15 consecutive periods -with equal probability of termination for each period.
Market Description
The market consists of ten traders. Each trader gets an initial endowment of 40 assets (to be precise: 40 units of ONE asset) and a working capital of 2000
Taler (experimental currency). In every period you can sell and/or buy assets, and your asset and Taler holdings are transferred to the next trading period, respectively. Each trading period automatically terminates after two minutes.
Dividends, Holding Costs, and Buyback of the Assets
At the end of each period you have to pay 1 Taler of holding costs for each asset you hold. Additionally, at the end of each trading period, you get a dividend for each asset you hold. The dividend is drawn randomly and can take on the following values.
Dividend for each Probability of asset in Taler the dividend 0 50%
50%
Your dividend earnings and holding costs during the course of the experiment are directly transferred to a savings account. Thus, the sum of holding costs and dividends for each asset is -1 or 1 with equal probability. All traders in the market get the information in the table mentioned above.
At the end of the experiment (after 8-15 periods) the assets you own are bought back by the experimenter. The buyback price is determined randomly and can take on the following values (all traders in the market get the information in the table mentioned below).
Probability of the buyback prices:
Buyback price for Probability of each asset in Taler the buyback price 15 80%
20%
Savings Account
Your dividend earnings received and your holding costs paid during the experiment are directly transferred to a savings account. At the end of the experiment the value of your savings account is added to your payoff (see below).
Trading
Trade is accomplished in form of a double auction, i.e., each trader can appear as buyer and seller at the same time. You can submit any quote of assets with prices ranging from 0 to a maximum of 999 Taler (with at most two decimal places).
For every quote you make, you have to enter the number of assets you intend to trade as well. Note that your Taler and asset holdings cannot drop below zero. If you buy assets, your Taler holdings will be diminished by the respective expenditures (price x quantity) and the number of assets will be increased by the quantity of newly bought assets. Inversely, if you sell assets, your Taler holdings will be increased by the respective revenues (price x quantity) and the number of assets will be decreased by the quantity of newly sold assets. Payoff structure: 
Calculation of your Earnings (payoff ) in EUR
Important Information
• Please note that some traders have a different payoff function.
• Your current fictive payoffs in EUR under both buyback prices are listed in the history screen (see below)
Instructions for Treatment CONVEX and Treatment HYBRID 14
General Information
Market Description
The market consists of ten traders. Each trader gets an initial endowment of 40 assets (to be precise: 40 units of ONE asset) and a working capital of 2000 Taler (experimental currency). In every period you can sell and/or buy assets, and your asset and Taler holdings are transferred to the next trading period, respectively. Each trading period automatically terminates after two minutes.
Dividends, Holding Costs, and Buyback of the Assets
50%
At the end of the experiment (after 8-15 periods) the assets you own are bought back by the experimenter. The buyback price is determined randomly and can 14 Instructions and screenshots are for Treatment CONVEX. In Treatment HYBRID the subjects with convex incentives received the same instruction as for Treatment CONVEX except one sentence mentioned below in bold. take on the following values (all traders in the market get the information in the table mentioned below).
Probability of the buyback prices:
20%
Savings Account
Trading
Trade is accomplished in form of a double auction, i.e., each trader can appear as buyer and seller at the same time. You can submit any quote of assets with prices ranging from 0 to a maximum of 999 Taler (with at most two decimal places). For every quote you make, you have to enter the number of assets you intend to trade as well. Note that your Taler and asset holdings cannot drop below zero. If you buy assets, your Taler holdings will be diminished by the respective expenditures (price x quantity) and the number of assets will be increased by the quantity of newly bought assets. Inversely, if you sell assets, your Taler holdings will be increased by the respective revenues (price x quantity) and the number of assets will be decreased by the quantity of newly sold assets. 
Calculation of your Earnings (payoff ) in EUR
Important Information
